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Heiko Rauhut and Fabian Winter
Types of Normative Conﬂicts and the
Effectiveness of Punishment
Abstract:While the current literature focuses on how social norms generate cooper-
ation, the issue of norm-related conﬂict deserves more attention. We develop a new
typology of normative conﬂict by combining Coleman’s (1990) distinction between
conjoint and disjoint norms with our own classiﬁcation of commitment-related and
content-related normative conﬂicts (Winter, Rauhut, and Helbing 2012). We outline a
theory of how the four resulting types of normative conﬂict can be ordered. We pro-
vide real-life examples and typical game-theoretical conceptualizations of the four
cases and suggest how they can be sorted according to their conﬂict potential and the
extent to which conﬂict can be restored by punishment. We then discuss a prototyp-
ical laboratory study for each of the types, and show how our theoretical arguments
can be applied. We conclude with a discussion of how previously anomalous empir-
ical results can be re-thought and understood in light of our theoretical reasoning.
Finally, we give suggestions for prospective empirical micro-level corroborations and
for mechanism design.
1 Introduction
Social norms have a pivotal role in sociology. They can serve as a “lubricant” of so-
cial order and facilitate social interaction in coordination problems such as which
side of the road to drive on, which greeting to use or what clothing to wear in which
context. They can also solve cooperation problems by prescribing contributions to
collective goods such as a clean environment, a safe neighborhood, or public infras-
tructure. Scholars of different schools of thought seem to converge around the idea
that social norms emerge because they have positive consequences for society. In
the functionalist approach, norms bridge the tension between individual self-interest
and the functional prerequisites of society (Durkheim 1997; Parsons 1968; Dahrendorf
1977). The rational-choice literature also argues that norms emerge when there is a
demand for them (Ullmann-Margalit 1977; Coleman 1990). A demand is typically given
in situations where everybody has an interest that all others cooperate but oneself.
Note: We thank Nikos Nikiforakis and Hironori Otsubo for allowing us to reanalyze their data, the Na-
ture publishing group for the right to reprint one ﬁgure from Fehr and Gächter (2002), and two anony-
mous reviewers for their helpful comments.HeikorRauhut acknowledgessupport by theSNSFStarting
Grant BSSGI0_155981. Correspondence should be addressed to HR or FW. Both authors contributed
equally to this work and are listed intentionally in alphabetical order.
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Mechanisms such as expected future interactions (Axelrod 1984), credible signals of
long-term interests inmutual social exchange (Gambetta 2009), or reputation-seeking
(Nowak and Sigmund 1998; Sigmund 2010; Wedekind and Milinski 2000; Berger and
Rauhut 2014) can explain cooperative behavior even among rational egoists. Interest-
ingly, the emphasis in the current literature is on the positive societal effects of social
norms: “The view that norms are created to prevent negative externalities, or to pro-
mote positive ones, is virtually canonical in the rational choice literature” (Hechter
and Opp 2001).
In contrast to the rich literature about the positive effects of social norms on coop-
eration, we concentrate on the largely neglected argument that social norms can also
generate conﬂict. Members of the samegroup canhold profoundly different normative
expectations of what ought to be done. This phenomenon, referred to as “normative
conﬂict”, generates conﬂict rather than cooperation. If ego holds a different norm to
alter, she can do everything right and have the best intentions to cooperate, but nev-
ertheless ﬁnd that her behavior is conceived of as improper. They fall into conﬂict,
despite both being convinced of having behaved adequately.
We start by introducing the concept of normative conﬂict by extending Coleman’s
(1990) conceptualization of norms. We give an introduction to social norms and co-
operation, and exemplify how norms prescribe how target actors ought to behave to
beneﬁt the beneﬁciaries of the norm. We ﬁrst focus on cases where all involved actors
share the same norm. Normative conﬂict, in this case, is about the level of norma-
tive commitment: how much should each actor sacriﬁce her self-interest to comply
with the norm? The second kind of normative conﬂict is about the normative content:
which kind of behavior is prescribed or proscribed in a given situation? For exam-
ple, people may hold exclusive norms of cooperation, such as equality versus equity
norms.
Our main argument in this article is that punishment has different effects in these
different types of normative conﬂicts. The standard case is the ﬁrst type of conﬂict
about the level of commitment. Here, research shows that punishment helps foster co-
operation. Our idea is that if people agree which norm to follow, punishment typically
helps push low contributors towards more cooperation. However, if people do not
agree which behavior should be conducted, that is, which normative content should
apply, punishment often has detrimental effects. In other words, if people disagree
about the kind of normative behavior that should be followed, punishment leads to
counter-punishment, feuds, and long-lasting conﬂicts. We develop our theoretical ar-
gument of the effectiveness of punishment based on real-life examples and evidence
fromexperiments.Webelieve that our proposed typology of normative conﬂict is help-
ful in re-reading the evidence of norm enforcement, and that we shed new light on the
question of when punishment is effective and when it is ineffective in promoting co-
operation.
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2 A typology of norm-related conﬂicts
Social norms deﬁne rules of how one ought to behave in a certain situation. To be
more precise, in norm-relevant situations, almost every member of a population be-
lieves that almost every other member has certain behavioral expectations. This im-
plies that norms are directed at certain actions, which can be called focal actions (Col-
man 1990:246).
The expectations about focal actions are directed towards targets of the norm
(equivalently one may say target actors or norm targets). Target actors are deﬁned by
Coleman (1990:247) as follows: “For any norm, there is a certain class of actors whose
actions or potential actions are the focal actions. [. . . ] I will call members of such a
class targets of the norm, or target actors.” Most norms beneﬁt a certain group of ac-
tors, who are called beneﬁciaries of the norm. These beneﬁciaries typically hold the
norm and are potential sanctioners of the target actors. Coleman (1990:247) deﬁnes
beneﬁciaries as “a class of actors who would beneﬁt from the norm, potentially hold
the norm, and are potential sanctioners of the target actors. These are actors who [. . . ]
assume the right to partially control the focal actions and are seen by others [. . . ] to
have this right.” In summary, target actors are individuals who are forced to restrict
their self-interest to follow the norm while beneﬁciaries are individuals who beneﬁt
from general adherence to this norm. Following the above deﬁnitions, we deﬁne social
norm as follows. A social norm is a commonly shared behavioral expectation among
beneﬁciaries and targets of a norm of how one ought to behave in a norm-relevant
situation, which is enforced by sanctions in case of norm violations (see also Winter,
Rauhut, and Helbing 2012).¹
Whereas the current debate is dominated by the argument that social norms solve
the problem of cooperation among rational egoists, we argue that social norms can
also trigger conﬂict. In our view, conﬂict can emerge from two sources. First, conﬂict
can emerge if target actors and beneﬁciaries of a norm belong to a different groupwith
different interests. We call this structural conﬂict. Second, conﬂict can emerge if actors
apply contradictingnorms in the samenorm-relevant situation.We call these conﬂicts
normative conﬂicts, and distinguish commitment from content-related normative con-
ﬂicts. In commitment-related conﬂicts, actors disagree about the extent to which the
norms should restrain their self-interest. In content-related conﬂicts, actors disagree
about which norm should be followed in which situation.
1 A related deﬁnition is suggested in the sociological tradition by Elster (1989:105): “Anorm [. . . ] is the
propensity to feel shame and to anticipate sanctions by others at the thought of behaving in a certain,
forbidden way. [. . . ] This propensity becomes a social norm when and to the extent that it is shared
with other people.” In economics, similar deﬁnitions are used. Fehr and Gächter (2000:166) deﬁne a
social norm as follows: “It is 1) a behavioral regularity; that is 2) based on a socially shared belief of
how one ought to behave; which triggers 3) the enforcement of the prescribed behavior by informal
social sanctions.”
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2.1 Structural conﬂicts
Much of the current literature focuses on the case of conjoint norms, where the beneﬁ-
ciaries and targets of the norm belong to the same set of actors.² In the case of doping,
all athletes are the target and likewise beneﬁt from the anti-doping norm. From an
individual perspective, doping yields a relative advantage at the price of damaging
one’s health. Whereas many cyclists prefer to accept this price, the relative advantage
vanishes if all athletes dope and end up with bad health, which is (paradoxically)
the same relative position compared to the situation in which nobody dopes. As for
many examples of conjoint norms, the social norm bridges the cleavage between self-
interest and collective good and can be modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma. The case
of non-aggression norms in the trench warfare of the First World War represents an-
other, by now classic, example of conjoint norms. Here, French and German soldiers
reduced their mortality risk by complying with strong behavioral norms to conduct
mutual fake assaults and show mutual respect of war interceptions (Ashworth 1980;
Axelrod 1984).
For some norms, the targets of a norm and the beneﬁciaries fall apart. In this case
of disjoint norms, the separation is typically associated with opposing interests and
causes conﬂict instead of cooperation. We can observe such conﬂict of interest be-
tween parents as the beneﬁciaries of a certain norm and their children as the target
of the norm. Coleman (1990:245) gives the example of a high school girl who is asked
by her friends to join them in smokingmarijuana.Whereas her friends disdain her re-
luctance, her parents disapprove her consent. In the area of gender differences, many
norms are disjoint. Consider the norms that women should not pursue a profession,
should not practice polygamous sex, or should not engage in politics. It seems that
such norms are targeted towards women to the beneﬁt of men. The conﬂict of interest
between the beneﬁciaries and targets of a norm might even be more pronounced in
the case of norms proscribing racial or homosexual discrimination.
We deﬁne structural conﬂict as the conﬂict of interest between the beneﬁciaries
and targets of a disjoint norm. Both beneﬁciaries and targets share the same behav-
ioral expectation of how one ought to behave in any given norm-relevant situation.
Nevertheless, only the beneﬁciary proﬁts from norm-compliant behavior, which is
produced by the target of the norm at own cost (Figure 1). Structural conﬂicts do not
necessarily depend on speciﬁc norms, but are an inherent property of some form of
heterogeneity in a situation’s social structure. Asymmetry between actors, like gender
or a parent-child relationship, allow for diverging behavioral expectations and form a
necessary condition for the emergence of structural conﬂict. Whether or not a struc-
tural conﬂict might exist can thus already be inferred by taking a close look at the
actors and their current social context, even before considering their speciﬁc social
norms.
2 The typology of conjoint and disjoint norms was introduced by Coleman (1990:247ff.).
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Beneﬁciaries
Norm Targets Beneﬁciaries
Norm
Targets
Beneﬁ-
ciaries Norm Targets
Notes: The left image illustrates conjoint norms. All targets of the norm beneﬁt from norm-compliant
behavior. The right image illustrates disjoint norms that prescribe or proscribe certain behaviors of
target actors, which beneﬁt a different set of actors. The intermediate case between conjoint and
disjoint norms is displayed in the middle.
Fig. 1: Structural conﬂicts by different types of norms (Source: Authors’ compilation).
2.2 Normative conﬂicts
The speciﬁcation of normative conﬂicts requires distinguishing two factors that gen-
erate behavioral expectations:³ the kind of action that should be undertaken and the
intensity of that action. We term the ﬁrst element “normative content”, deﬁned as the
kind of behavior that is prescribed or proscribed in a given situation. It provides in-
formation about which of the situation’s characteristics should be evaluated when
choosing an action. We term the second element “level of normative commitment”.
This indicates that social norms usually require an actor to restrict self-interest in fa-
vor of another person’s or group’s wellbeing. Consequently, we deﬁne this element
as the extent to which an actor should sacriﬁce self-interest to comply with the norm.
The level of normative commitment is not ﬁxed.While some normsmay require strong
restrictions, others are less demanding.
The idea of content-related normative conﬂicts can be illustrated by the follow-
ing examples. When it comes to performance-related salaries, blue-collar employees
often consider harmfulworking conditions as an important determinant, whilewhite-
collar employees stress value creation (HymanandBrough 1975). In another study, sol-
diers differed over whether military merits or the fact of being married with children
ought to be considered important for deciding early demobilization after World War
II (Stouffer 1949). Alternatively, a group of employees in a ﬁrm may call for equal pay
in contrast to a second group demanding a payment scheme based on added value.
Thus, attributes such as working conditions, family status or children may serve as
normative “cues” which determine the allocation of scarce goods (such as money or
demobilization).
Consequently, we deﬁne normative conﬂict as a transaction failure resulting from
actors holding at least partially exclusive normative expectations. The distinction be-
tween content and commitment of a normenables us to classify conﬂicts based on dis-
tinct contents versus distinct commitments. Normative conﬂicts are interesting inas-
much as they describe situations inwhich actors adhere to social norms, believe them-
selves to be behaving correctly, and nevertheless experience conﬂicts.
3 See also Winter, Rauhut, and Helbing 2012:920f.
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Obviously, it is possible to imagine combinations of structural andnormative con-
ﬂicts. For example, there can be norm-relevant situations in which the same group of
beneﬁciaries favors different disjoint norms, which would beneﬁt them to the same
extent. Thus, they do not agree on whether norm A or norm B is the appropriate norm
that should be demanded from the norm targets to please the beneﬁciaries. Note that
we concentrate only on the pure cases in this chapter.
3 The theory on the effectiveness of peer
punishment for different types of norm-related
conﬂicts
Our typology of structural and normative conﬂicts can be cross-tabulated two by two.
This yields four cases. The cross-tabulation is depicted in Table 1 and visualized in
Figure 2.
This typology is helpful in systematizing theoretical and empirical research on
social norms. We illustrate this for schematizing research on the effectiveness of peer
punishment for the promotion of cooperation norms. We conjecture that peer pun-
ishment is more effective for commitment-related than for content-related conﬂicts. It
is also more effective in the absence of structural conﬂicts, where norms are conjoint
rather than disjoint. Our reasoning suggests the following order for the effectiveness
of punishment: commitment-related conﬂicts over conjoint norms, commitment-re-
lated conﬂicts over disjoint norms, content-related conﬂicts over conjoint norms, and
then content-related conﬂicts over disjoint norms. This order is conceptualized by the
arrow in Figure 2.
We illustrate our reasoning by giving examples and typical game-theoretical con-
ceptualizations for each of the four cases. The ﬁrst case of commitment-related con-
ﬂicts over conjoint norms is the simplest andmost prototypical one. A classic example
is environmental protection (Diekmann and Preisendörfer 2003). All beneﬁt if every-
body contributes to environmental protection. The beneﬁciaries are also the target ac-
tors of the norm of eco-cooperation. The typical conﬂict is how much to contribute
to eco-cooperation. In other words, people can disagree about the level of normative
commitment. For example, is it sufficient to buy energy-saving lamps, or should one
Tab. 1: Effectiveness of punishment.
Normative conﬂict
Commitment-related conﬂict Content-related conﬂict
Structural No (conjoint norm) Very high Low
conﬂict Yes (disjoint norm) High Very low
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Notes: This 2 × 2 typology yields four cases, for which typical examples are listed at each branch of
the tree diagram. To the right of the examples are typical game-theoretical conceptualizations of the
interaction structure. The four cases are ordered by increasing potential for normative conﬂicts and
decreasing effectiveness of peer punishment. This order is conceptualized by the arrow on the right.
Fig. 2: Typology of normative conﬂicts by commitment versus content related conﬂicts when struc-
tural conﬂict is present or absent (Source: Authors’ compilation).
also buy a fuel-thrifty car, or refrain from owning a personal car, or even abstain from
ﬂying to holiday destinations? A typical abstract conceptualization of these commit-
ment-related conﬂicts is a public goodsgamewherepeople cancontributemoreor less
to a common pool, from which all group members beneﬁt equally. Peer-punishment
is most effective in this case, since it “only” coordinates the cooperation level.
The second case of commitment-related conﬂicts over disjoint norms can be illus-
trated by the example of parental bargaining over a one-sided career break for child-
rearing. When expecting a child, a couple may be interested in one partner keeping to
his or her career track to earn sufficient money for the family, while the other partner
takes a career break to raise the child. In this case, one parent is the target of the norm
and is expected to invest time and energy for child rearing, with the consequence of
sacriﬁcing some career advantages. The beneﬁciary, on the other hand, can continue
his or her career. Normative expectations in this case are one-sided, so that this case
satisﬁes the conditions of a disjoint norm. Beneﬁciary and target actor may bargain
about how much the target actor should invest in child-rearing and how many career
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options it is tolerable to lose. Disagreement may therefore emerge about the level of
normative commitment the target actor is expected to fulﬁll.
The strategic interaction structure may be generalized to an abstract ultimatum
game. A proposer can decide how to distribute a common pie and a responder can ac-
cept or reject. Rejection can be regarded as altruistic punishment, since the pie is lost
to both parties. The structurally weaker responder often adheres to a fairness norm
and rejects offers that are too low. This norm is disjoint, since target actor and beneﬁ-
ciary fall apart.
We expect punishment to be less effective for the enforcement of a requested level
of commitment for the latter case of disjoint norms, compared to the former case of
conjoint norms. The reason is that the conﬂict of interests in disjoint norms hampers
the alignment of a mutually agreed level of commitment. In conjoint norms, there is
no conﬂict of interests; both parties “merely” have to coordinate on how much self-
interest should be restrained to beneﬁt everybody in the group.
The third case of content-related conﬂicts over conjoint norms can be exempliﬁed
by distinct norms of environmental protection. Take the case of global climate protec-
tion. Some parties may argue that heavy polluters should contribute larger shares to
global climate protection than low polluters. In contrast, other parties may adhere to
an equality principle and may demand that all parties should contribute equally to
global climate protection. This case exempliﬁes conjoint norms, since all target actors
beneﬁt equally from a cleaner and more protected global environment. However, tar-
get actors disagree about which normative contents should be followed to protect the
environment.
In more abstract terms, the strategic interaction structure can be conceptualized
by a heterogeneous public goods game. For example, target actors can have differ-
ent production costs to produce the same level of the public good. To stay with our
example, in countries with a lower technological level, the fulﬁllment of certain envi-
ronmental guidelines takes higher relative prices compared to countries with a high
technological level.⁴ We expect punishment to be less effective here than in the former
cases, since disagreement about normative principles is harder to resolve compared to
disagreement about the level atwhich commonly agreed principles should be adhered
to.
The fourth case of content-related conﬂicts over disjoint norms is illustrated by
parental bargaining over different educational principles in a family that divides la-
bor between child-rearing andbreadwinning. This situation describes a disjoint norm,
where the child-raiser is target actor of the norm to invest time and energy for child-
rearing. The educator and the breadwinner may, however, disagree with the educa-
4 A comparable conﬂict over contents can bemodeled by different per capita returns that target actors
receive from the same production levels at same production costs from all contributing target actors
(e.g., Nikifourakis). We will discuss this case in the next section.
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tional principles. For example, one may favor an anti-authoritarian, and the other an
authoritarian, style. The underlying motive of both styles may be similar inasmuch as
both are geared towards making the best of the education of the child – they are just
different means to serve this end.
Inmore abstract terms, the fourth case can be conceptualized by a heterogeneous
ultimatum game. For example, a proposer and a responder can be heterogeneous in
their contributions to a common pool, which needs to be divided. A high-contributing
responder may demand more than equal shares from the common pool, while a low-
contributing proposer has a structural advantage andmay insist on equal shares. This
yields a disjoint normative situation between proposer (beneﬁciary) and responder
(target actor), where both adhere to different normative contents (an equity versus an
equality norm). This represents an abstract model of a structurally advantaged bread-
winner, who requests that the child-rearer follow his or her favored norm. We argue
that the conﬂict is largest in this fourth case: there is disagreement about the content
of the norm, and there is a structural conﬂict of interests between target actor and
beneﬁciary. Therefore, we expect punishment to be least effective in these situations.
Comparing cases one and two with cases three and four, we expect disagreement
about the level of commitment to be more easily resolvable than disagreement about
normative contents. In commitment-related conﬂicts, everybody agrees about the
normative principles. Punishment “merely” helps to align contribution levels in the
group. In content-related conﬂicts, however, people disagree about which principle
should be followed to produce the public good. This is a more fundamental conﬂict,
where punishment is likely to provoke counter-punishment, feuds, and barely-resolv-
able cleavages. This reasoning leads us to the proposed order of the level of conﬂict
and the effectiveness of punishment for the four types of norm-related conﬂicts.
One theoretical reason for the order of the level of conﬂict and the effectiveness of
punishment is that the types can also be ordered by the number of potential conﬂicts.
The number of potential conﬂicts is increasing from the ﬁrst to the last type. Com-
mitment-related conﬂicts over conjoint norms have one source of conﬂict: the level
of commitment. Commitment-related conﬂicts over disjoint norms have two sources
of conﬂict: the level of commitment and the structural conﬂict (beneﬁciary vs. target
actor). Content-related conﬂicts over conjoint norms also have two sources of conﬂict:
the level of commitment and the content. Finally, content-related conﬂicts over dis-
joint norms have three sources of conﬂict: the level of commitment, the content and
the structure (beneﬁciary vs. target actor).
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4 Experimental evidence on the effectiveness of peer
punishment for different types of norm-related
conﬂicts
In the following, we systematize experimental research on the effectiveness of pun-
ishment. This is done by discussing exemplary ﬁndings for each type of normative
conﬂict.
4.1 Commitment-related conﬂicts over conjoint norms
A classic study on the effectiveness of punishment in public-good provisions is Fehr
and Gächter (2002). In this study, groups of four could invest in a linear public good
with a marginal per capita return of 0.4. This creates a situation where everybody’s
egoistic incentive is to contribute nothing (since every monetary unit yields individ-
ual returns of 0.4). However, if everybody contributes, everybody receives higher earn-
ings (4 ⋅ 0.4 = 1.6 received units from each contributed unit). This creates a conjoint
cooperation norm, since group members are beneﬁciaries and target actors for the
contribution to the public good.
In one condition, groupmembers could punish others after having seen their con-
tribution level. In this way, different levels of commitment to the cooperation norm
could be coordinated. In most cases, high contributors punished low contributors.
This increased the commitment to almost full contributions. In a condition without
punishment, however, cooperation decreased substantially (Figure 3). This ﬁnding
has been replicated several times and has become a textbook result in behavioral
game theory (e.g., Camerer 2003). In light of our theory, the study demonstrates the
high effectiveness of punishment for commitment-related disagreements about how
much to contribute to a conjoint cooperation norm.
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4.2 Commitment-related conﬂicts over disjoint norms
Disjoint norms are situations in which beneﬁciaries and target actors of a norm fall
apart. The ultimatum game offers an abstract conceptualization of this conﬂict of
interests. A proposer decides howmuch of a common pie to distribute to a responder.
The responder can accept or reject. Rejection destroys all payments for both parties.
The structurally stronger proposer is the target of a fairness norm to split equally
(50 : 50). The structurally weaker responder beneﬁts from this norm, because a ratio-
nal and egoistic proposer would offer the smallest possible amount, which a rational
and egoistic responder would accept (since this is more than nothing). Disjoint fair-
ness norms can, however, sustain a fairness norm for two reasons (Fehr and Schmidt
1999). The proposer splits close to equal if she is inequality-averse and prefers equal
outcomes compared to unequal, but higher, personal earnings. Second, the proposer
could believe that the responder is sufficiently inequality-averse and prefers equal
zero earnings compared to unequal positive earnings. This also generates a fairness
norm. Several studies support both arguments: proposers offer substantial amounts
even without a rejection possibility, and the proposers’ violations of a fairness norm
are often punished by the responders’ rejections (Camerer 2003).
Avrahami et al. (2013) conducted an often-repeated ultimatum game experiment
with changing partners. This design allows us to study the evolution of fairness norms
and the effectiveness of punishment for norm enforcement. We reanalyzed their data
to yield some support for our conjecture about the effectiveness of punishment. Our
analysis showed that the adherence to a fairness norm of 50 : 50 quickly and strongly
converges towards consensus (Figure 4 left). Violations of this norm are punished
by rejections (Figure 4 right). Since the proportion of multilateral norm adherence
strongly increases, the occurrence of punishment decreases over time, suggesting that
the norm reproduces itself over and over again.
This experiment simulates an abstract scenario of commitment-related conﬂicts
in disjoint norms. Mostly, the proposer and the responder agree that the proposer
should offer some part of the pie to the responder. However, both can disagree about
the proportion, that is, about the level of commitment to the fairness norm of a fully
equal split.
We argue that in disjoint norms, the conﬂict of interests between beneﬁciary and
target actor makes punishment less effective compared to conjoint norms. Some evi-
dence for this argument can be deduced from a comparison of Figures 3 and 4. In dis-
joint norms (the ultimatum game), the norm takes longer to evolve and breaks down
at the end. The evolution of the conjoint cooperation norm in public-good provisions
is faster and there is no endgame effect (i.e., no breakdown of cooperation).
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 06.04.18 09:27
250 | Heiko Rauhut and FabianWinter
 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 eq
ua
lit
y n
or
m
0 20 40 60 80 100
Period
50% offered, 50% accepted
50% offered, less accepted
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 re
je
ct
ed
 o
ffe
rs
0 20 40 60 80 100
Period
Notes: The grey line in the left panel shows the proportion of unilateral full adherence to the equal-
ity norm over time (proposer offers 50 : 50). The black line shows bilateral full adherence to the
equality norm (proposer offers and responder demands 50 : 50). The right panel shows the pro-
portion of responders’ peer sanctioning of violations of the fairness norm over time (rejections by
responders).
Fig. 4: Convergence of a disjoint fairness norm in a repeated ultimatum game (Source: Own compila-
tion of reanalyzed data from Avrahami et al. 2013).
4.3 Content-related conﬂicts over conjoint norms
We conjecture that content-related conﬂicts are stronger than commitment-related
conﬂicts. The dispute is not only about how much self-interest should be sacriﬁced
to comply with the norm. It is a conﬂict about different principles, and about different
conceptions of how to produce the norm. As in the argument above, we expect more
conﬂict for disjoint than for conjoint norms.
An experimental implementation of content-related conﬂicts over conjoint norms
is given by Nikiforakis, Noussair, and Wilkening (2012). As in the experiment by Fehr
and Gächter (2002) discussed above, they designed a public-goods experiment with
groups of four, where individuals could invest up to 20monetary units in a public good
in each period. The marginal per capita return was always such that individual con-
tributions yielded lower returns, but collective contributions yielded higher average
group earnings, creating a social dilemma. There was a baseline punishment condi-
tion like the one in Fehr and Gächter (2002). We call this condition “no normative con-
ﬂict with punishment” (Figure 5). In this condition, there was a symmetric marginal
per capita return of 0.4 for all groupmembers. This yielded an individual return of 0.4
for each contributed unit and a 60%group beneﬁt from every unit contributed by oth-
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Notes: The left panel shows the probability of punishment and counter-punishment in collective-
goods games with only commitment-related conﬂicts (white) and with content-related normative
conﬂicts (black). The right panel shows the dynamical consequences of punishment and counter-
punishment in terms of average collective-good provisions. The lines refer to a symmetric game
(without content conﬂicts; upper line), an asymmetric game (with content conﬂicts; middle line) and
a control treatment without punishment (lower line).
Fig. 5: Normative conﬂict leads to feuds and less effective punishment (Source: Own compilation
based on the data by Nikiforakis, Noussair, and Wilkening 2012).
ers. Extending previous experiments, counter-punishment was allowed. This means
punished individuals could punish back,which could again be retaliated and so forth.
Hence, feuds in terms of punishment series were allowed.
This treatment was contrasted with an asymmetric public goods game with pun-
ishment. We call this treatment “normative conﬂict with punishment” (Figure 5). The
asymmetry was implemented in terms of different per capita returns. Prior to the ex-
periment, subjects competed in a real-effort task about advantageous positions in the
public goods game. Winners were selected to receive high marginal per capita returns
(0.5), and losers were selected to receive low marginal per capita returns (0.3). This
created a situation in which winners had higher returns from public-good contribu-
tions than losers. In this sense, winners had a stronger interest in the public good
than losers.
The asymmetry in returns created normative conﬂicts between two possible con-
tribution norms. First, actors could adhere to a libertarian norm and demand equal
contributions from all groupmembers (whichwould result in higher earnings for win-
ners). Alternatively, actors could adhere to an equality (redistribution) norm and de-
mand that all group members should earn equally (requiring higher contributions
fromwinners). To put it differently, the ﬁrst normprescribed equal inputs (and implied
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unequal outputs). The second norm prescribed equal outputs (and implied unequal
inputs).
Both treatments were comparedwith a control condition inwhich no punishment
was implemented. Otherwise, this condition was similar to the last one mentioned
inasmuch as per capita returns were asymmetric. We call this treatment “normative
conﬂict without punishment”.
The left panel in Figure 5 shows punishment and counter-punishment probabil-
ities for both punishment treatments. Counter-punishment is about three times as
likely and about 70%more severe in the asymmetric treatmentwith normative conﬂict
over contents (black bars) compared to the symmetric treatment without normative
conﬂict over commitments (white bars).
Counter-punishment can be regarded as an indicator of normative conﬂict for the
following reason. If the punished party adheres to a different norm from the punisher,
punishment is unjustiﬁed from the perspective of the punished party. A normatively
adequate response is counter-punishment. In this sense, normative conﬂicts aremea-
surable by punishment feuds.
The macro-level consequences of normative conﬂicts and counter-punishments
are lower levels of cooperation. This is demonstrated by the right panel of Figure 5.
The contributions in public-goods problemswith normative conﬂicts (middle line) are
considerably lower than in the conditionwithoutnormative conﬂicts (upper line). This
is due to more and harsher counter-punishments in the case of normative conﬂicts.
Both treatments can be compared to a version without the possibility of punish-
ment (right panel, lowest line, “normative conﬂict, no punishment”). Without pun-
ishment, normative conﬂicts cannot be resolved and cooperation breaks down com-
pletely. It is noteworthy that the breakdownof cooperation is stronger than in the sym-
metric version without punishment, as Fehr and Gächter outlined it (2002). Kings-
ley (2016) replicates this ﬁnding on the adverse effects of content-related normative
conﬂict in a similar study. More importantly, however, he showed that punishment
loses its effectiveness even without the possibility of counter-punishment. Taken to-
gether, these results indicate that persistent content-related conﬂicts destroy cooper-
ation more severely than commitment-related conﬂicts.
4.4 Content-related conﬂicts over disjoint norms
We argue that the strongest conﬂict with the least effective punishment is the case of
content-related conﬂicts over disjoint norms. Here, people disagree about the norma-
tive rule and beneﬁciary and target actors have different interests. One example where
people disagree about normative contents is when they have put different levels of ef-
fort into a collective good or have experienced different outcomes from it. A casewhere
norms are disjoint is given if targets do not beneﬁt from the norm. An exemplary ab-
stract strategic setting of this kind is a heterogeneous ultimatum game.
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Winter, Rauhut, and Helbing (2012) conducted such a heterogeneous ultimatum
game experiment. Participants engaged in a real-effort task several days before the
experiment. This yielded different monetary endowments for proposers and respon-
ders. These different endowmentswere based ondifferent levels of effort. People could
specify their offers to responders and their least acceptable offer from proposers for
both roles (the “strategy vectormethod”). Theywere then assigned roles and partners,
who typically had different endowments to contribute to the common pie.
About half of the participants acted according to an equality norm. As proposers,
they offered an equal split to the responders, and as responders, they demanded an
equal split. The other half of the participants, however, acted according to an equity
norm. As proposers, their offers were proportional to their effort. They offered less to
the responders if the responders had contributed less than themselves. Likewise, they
offered more to the responders if the responders had contributed more than they had.
About half of the responders followed this pattern and demanded offers thatwere pro-
portional to their level of effort. This norm can be regarded as an alternative fairness
rule where outcome is proportional to input.
The two different norms generate conﬂict if the proposer has contributed more
than the responder, and if the proposer holds an equity and the responder an equal-
ity norm. In this case, the proposer offers less than half to the responder, while the
responder requests half of the pie.
Winter, Rauhut, and Helbing (2012) estimated normative types (equity versus
equality norm followers) and analyzed the likelihood of conﬂicts for pairs holding
similar and different norms. Conﬂicts in the ultimatum game were operationalized as
rejected offers. It turned out that conﬂicts occurred substantially more often if actors
disagreed about the normative content than if they adhered to the same normative
content (Figure 6). This gives evidence for our theory that content-related conﬂicts in
disjoint norms represent the most severe case of conﬂict.
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Notes: Conﬂict rates represent rejections in ultimatum games. No
normative conﬂict represents cases where proposer and responder
adhere to the same norm (both equality or both equity). Norma-
tive conﬂict represents cases where proposer and responder hold
different norms (one equality and the other equity).
Fig. 6: Conﬂict rates without (content-related) normative conﬂicts (left) and with (content-related)
normative conﬂicts (right) (Source: Own compilation based on the data by Winter, Rauhut, and Hel-
bing 2012).
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5 Implications
Our terminology developed here sorts our reasoning about conﬂicts and promotes a
moremulti-faceted viewabout theunderlyingmechanismsof normativebehavior. Our
theoretical arguments may invite people to rethink cooperation failures observed in
the lab and in the ﬁeld. One such example may be the explanation of seemingly “an-
tisocial” behavior. Hermann, Thöni, and Gächter (2008) conducted a public-goods
experiment with punishment (see section 4.1) in several different countries. They
found that some societies tend to limit punishment to low contributors, while others
also punish high contributors. The authors argued that their results might best be
explained by heterogeneity in “civic duty norms” across societies: “[I]f participant
pools held different social norms with regard to cooperation and free-riding, they
actually might have punished differently” (Hermann, Thöni, and Gächter 2008:1365,
emphasis added). In contrast, our theoretical sketch developed here suggests that
“antisocial” punishment is an indicator of normative conﬂicts within societies. One
subgroup of a societymight try to promote a high level of commitment to the collective
good and only punish under-contributors. At the same time, another group might be
discouraged by other people trying to force them to do anything, even if it was in their
best interest. This group perceives high-contributors as overly ambitious, vain, or
even hypocritical, and fears that they raise the bar of cooperation too high. A similar
norm of modesty has already been reported in the Hawthorne experiments by Roeth-
lisberger and Dickson (2003:384 [1939]). Instead of enforcing high contributions, they
punish those who contribute too much. Norm violations are thus punished by two
opposed groups: over- and under-contributors.
6 Conclusion
This chapter outlines new theoretical ideas about normative conﬂicts and provides a
new typology. Four types are distinguished based on the distinction between conjoint
and disjoint norms by Coleman (1990) and our own classiﬁcation of commitment-re-
lated and content-related normative conﬂicts (Winter, Rauhut, and Helbing 2012). We
order the four types of normative conﬂicts according to their conﬂict potential and
their effectiveness with which conﬂict can be restored by punishment.
So far, the literature discussed commitment-related conﬂicts as themain problem.
Here, peoplemust agree on the extent to which social norms should restrain their self-
interest. Despite agreement that a speciﬁc norm should be followed, “undercutting”
is regarded as legitimate by some and unacceptable by others. Thus, different degrees
of normative commitment are an important source of normative conﬂict.
However, we conjecture that content-related conﬂicts are more severe than com-
mitment-related ones. Consequently, we expect punishment in content-related con-
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ﬂicts to be less effective in restoring cooperation. Despite actors deciding to be co-
operative and contributing an appropriate share to the commons, they hold different
norms of what they consider to be fair.
The driving factors of commitment-related conﬂicts are different levels of selﬁsh-
ness or diverging beliefs about the cooperativeness of others. We expect people to be
relatively open to persuasion to bemore cooperativewhen others are also cooperative.
We argue that people are also relatively open to argumentation that others are more
cooperative than they had believed.
In contrast, we expect content-related conﬂicts to be less easy restorable. When
actors hold distinct convictions (i.e., when there is normative conﬂict), different nor-
mative viewpoints tend to be strongly defended, makingmore conﬂict resolution nec-
essary. Others must be made amenable to different points of view. Communication,
clariﬁcation and approval of distinct moral principles needmore time and energy and
more complexkindsof conﬂict resolution thanpunishment. For example, taking turns
can be one solution for the peaceful coexistence of different moral principles (Winter
2014).
An obvious next research step would be the development of an empirical research
design through which all types of conﬂicts can be studied in a more comparable way.
Our comparison over different experiments, subject pools and designs is limited to
providing some insights and novel ideas. A next step would require a setup in which
only the types of conﬂicts vary. The most direct test of our theoretical conjectures
would be a laboratory design in which all types of normative conﬂicts were imple-
mented and subjectswere randomly allocated to different types of normative conﬂicts.
A measure of normative conﬂict could be the extent of counter-punishment in all four
types of normative conﬂicts. Ideally, such a laboratory design would go hand in hand
with an analytical model, from which the hypothesized extent of conﬂict and effec-
tiveness of punishment can be deduced.
Despite not having formulated a rigorous theoretical model and having not pro-
vided results from a tailor-made laboratory experiment, we believe that our typology
hasmany new implications for the understanding of when social order emerges spon-
taneously and how it can be organized bymechanismdesign. We believe that our new
perspective can guide social theory and be applied to conﬂict resolution in the under-
standing and management of social norms, cooperation, and conﬂicts.
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